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Genocide and Repeat Offenders
After World War II, as the full extent of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis during
the Holocaust came to light, there was a sweeping sentiment of “Never again.” Never
again could a state be allowed to attempt such human destruction. The Nuremberg
trials brought convictions for crimes against humanity, the United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) was adopted in
1948, and memorials were built around the world. Yet, in a sense, the Holocaust itself
was an example of “again.” Not only did it come in the wake of the Armenian Geno-
cide,1 but Germans themselves had already committed genocide in the twentieth cen-
tury through their slaughter of the Herero and Nama peoples of German South-West
Africa.2 Scholars have identiﬁed many parallels in examining these cases, with the Ger-
man experience in South-West Africa having acted as a testing ground for ideas and
methods later “perfected” by the Nazis.3
While Isabel Hull has found a common military culture in Germany oriented
toward seeking “ﬁnal solutions,”4 the genocide in Africa was committed by the regime
of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Holocaust by the Nazis, with the Weimar government se-
parating the two. Later in the century, one regime was allowed to commit not one but
two mass killings, each of which can be argued to be cases of genocide. Within the span
of a decade, the New Order regime of Suharto in Indonesia organized both the killing
of hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged leftists within Indonesia from
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1965 to 1966—hereafter referred to as “the Killings”—and then, in 1975, invaded East
Timor, which was subjected to a brutal, 24-year occupation. To my knowledge, there has
yet to be a detailed, direct comparison of these two cases.5 Following the example of the
German cases, this article examines the characteristics and methods of the Killings and
the occupation campaigns in East Timor to ﬁnd similarities and to determine what role
the Indonesian experience in the Killings played in shaping later actions in East Timor.
Based on this case comparison, I also explore the implications of impunity for the orga-
nizers of the atrocities, and how this impunity has led to a normalization of genocidal
policies in Indonesia, which may be seen today in the ongoing conﬂict in West Papua.
I ﬁrst turn to the story of the Killings, how they were committed, and who was
responsible. This discussion is followed by the history of the invasion and subsequent
occupation of East Timor, in which I make note of the violent practices and discourse
that carried over from the 1965–1966 Killings, highlighting the similarities in anti-
Communist sentiment, military tactics, targeting of women and ethnic Chinese, biologi-
cal rhetoric of infection and extermination, and post-violence impunity. I then assess
whether or not these cases were or should be considered genocide, and what implica-
tions they hold for the prevention and further study of the crime.
The Indonesian Killings
Indonesia’s New Order regime came to power in 1965 in the wake of a complicated and
much-debated event. Since independence from the Dutch in 1948, Indonesia was led by
Sukarno,6 whose charismatic leadership enabled him to balance the power of the coun-
try’s political parties and the highly inﬂuential military. The key tenet of Sukarno’s
political program, called Guided Democracy, was Nasakom, which stood for “national-
ism, religion, communism.”7 While this principle served as part of Sukarno’s shrewd
political balancing act, he did in fact attempt to move the country to the left, for
instance by withdrawing from the United Nations and building closer ties with Com-
munist states in Asia. It is undeniable that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was
a great beneﬁciary of Sukarno’s policies: the PKI had been excluded from government
until 1957, but, with Sukarno’s emphasis on Nasakom, began to hold bureaucratic and
political ofﬁces and also gained inﬂuence in the military, especially in the air force, with
which it shared a dislike of the army.8 The PKI used its newfound inﬂuence to promote
policies such as land redistribution and the arming of workers and peasants to form a
“ﬁfth force” that would counter the power of the army, navy, air force, and police. The
issue of land redistribution was particularly contentious, with the PKI and its afﬁliates
sometimes using “direct action” land occupations to dispossess landowners, and both
party activists and landowners resorted to violence in the competition for land.9 The
land reforms came in the early 1960s, at a time of economic crisis that was exacerbated
by Sukarno’s misguided policies and had “left Indonesia as one of the poorest countries
in the world, its name conjuring up much the same connotations of chaos and misery
that the names of the Congo and Sierra Leone conjure up today.”10 The great economic
decline and increasing tensions between political parties led to an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty, strained even further by Sukarno’s increasing health problems and six attempts
on his life.11
The tensions ﬁnally boiled over on 1 October 1965. While there is much uncertainty
regarding the facts,12 what is certain is that on the night of September 30, a group of
middle-ranking ofﬁcers—who became known as the 30 September Movement (G-30-S)
and were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung13—kidnapped and murdered six generals of
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the military high command and one lieutenant and also fatally wounded the six-year-
old daughter of General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Minister of Defense. The G-30-S
announced that they had undertaken this action to counter a plan by right-wing mili-
tary leaders to seize power from Sukarno and that they were forming a Revolutionary
Council to help govern the country.14 Major-General Suharto, commander of the Army
Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), quickly mobilized troops to crush the rebel ofﬁcers. By
evening on October 1, Suharto, collaborating with other army ofﬁcers, was in control of
Jakarta.
The true role of the PKI in events surrounding G-30-S might never be known, but
most scholars agree that while the PKI might have been peripherally tied to the plotters
and some elements of the party expressed support for the group, the party was not
responsible for G-30-S.15 Public perception, however, was that the PKI was behind G-
30-S, and Suharto and his clique moved quickly to promote and exploit this viewpoint.
As Robert Cribb writes, Suharto “took steps to consolidate the already widespread pub-
lic presumption that the PKI had masterminded the coup (and was probably planning
further actions) and encouraged rumors that the communists had been planning to tor-
ture and murder their enemies.”16 Suharto and Nasution had been pushing the mur-
dered generals to take more action to check the PKI’s growing inﬂuence and preserve
military autonomy,17 and, now in power, they seized the opportunity to fulﬁll this
desire. Public sentiment was inﬂamed by the exhumation of the bodies of the murdered
generals and a public funeral for Nasution’s daughter.
Rumors were spread through the press that the generals had been tortured and muti-
lated, with their eyes gouged out and their genitals cut off by members of Gerwani, a wo-
men’s association afﬁliated with the PKI. The Gerwani members allegedly followed this
orgy of violence by participating in a literal orgy.18 These claims were proven false by the
ofﬁcial autopsies conducted on October 4 and 5 after the bodies were exhumed,19 and Su-
karno attempted to speak out against journalists writing “untrue things,”20 but Suharto
and the military had already seized the momentum. The autopsy results were never pub-
licly released, and so anger and fear were cultivated and directed toward the PKI. Marshall
Green, the US ambassador to Indonesia at the time, aided these efforts, recommending
“increased covert efforts ‘to spread the story of the PKI's guilt, treachery, and brutality,’
although he was unsure of the evidence of the PKI's role,”21 while the British and Malay-
sians also worked to inﬂame anti-Communist sentiment.22 Many Indonesians were also
reminded of the Madiun affair of 1948, when a small Communist group rebelled against
the larger Indonesian army during the ﬁght for independence from the Dutch.23
Through the media and ofﬁcial statements, the PKI were not only blamed, but sys-
tematically dehumanized. G-30-S was dubbed Gestapu by Brigadier General Sugandhi,
amalgamating the Indonesian name Gerakan September Tigapuluh with the connota-
tions of the German Gestapo clearly in mind.24 Especially in light of the false stories
about Gerwani actions in the killing of the generals, PKI members and supporters were
painted as “bloodthirsty and sexually sadistic monsters”25 and “scurvy mongrels [who]
put their slimy claws on the innocent souls of our children.”26 One paper printed a car-
toon showing the PKI and associated organizations as lizards lapping up the blood of
the murdered generals.27 The success of this propaganda is exempliﬁed by one killer’s
remark, “I did not kill people. I killed wild animals.”28
Also of central importance was the view of Communists as atheists, both immoral
and exercising a corrupting inﬂuence on Indonesian society. In the wake of the coup,
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the military newspaper Angkatan Bersendjata characterized the campaign against the
PKI as a holy war, writing that “the sword cannot be met by the Koran . . . but must be
met by the sword.”29 The equation of Communism with atheism also served to further
dehumanize PKI supporters, since “‘belief in the one God’ is the ﬁrst of the ﬁve princi-
ples which comprise the Pancasila, the national ideology contained in the Preamble to
the Constitution. Thus for its enemies the PKI was automatically disqualiﬁed from
inclusion in Indonesia.”30
Seeking to organize the anger they had built up and lacking the troop strength or
intelligence necessary to destroy the PKI using military forces alone,31 military leaders
met with younger leaders of anti-Communist parties and religious organizations, and
banded together to form the militant Action Front to Crush the Gestapu (KAP-
Gestapu), which began holding protest rallies. Having whipped the non-Communist popu-
lation into a furor, military leaders decided to begin releasing the anger. At the funeral
of Nasution’s daughter, “as if by pre-arrangement, a high naval ofﬁcer gave Moslem stu-
dent leaders a one-word signal, sikat, which means ‘sweep.’”32 The next day, on Octo-
ber 8, after a KAP-Gestapu rally ﬁlled with anti-PKI speeches, a group of members of
Muslim student organizations marched to the PKI headquarters, which they attacked
and burned. Harold Crouch argues that while the mob had not sought permission for
this action from military or KAP-Gestapu leaders, “it is likely that they had been
assured by junior army ofﬁcers that the senior generals would not be displeased if the
PKI building were ‘spontaneously’ attacked by the ‘people.’”33 Brian May, however,
found that the PKI building was destroyed “while soldiers blocked the approaching
streets and ﬁremen looked on.”34 Rumors were spread that the PKI had been compiling
death lists and planning a purge of non-Communists, creating fears that it was a situa-
tion of “kill or be killed.”35
In the days after the funeral and attacks on PKI headquarters in Jakarta, the ﬁrst
massacres of PKI supporters began in heavily Muslim Aceh, with troops from the
regional military command and Muslim youth groups hunting people down and killing
them. According to some accounts, the families and household servants of PKI cadres
were also among the “several thousand” killed, and Brigadier General Ishak Djurasa,
the commander in the area, described Aceh as “the ﬁrst region to be cleansed of coun-
terrevolutionary G.30.S elements.”36 By December, Djurasa told the press that “the PKI
is no longer a problem for Aceh because the region has been entirely purged in a physi-
cal sense of PKI elements.”37 In the second half of October, mass killings of alleged PKI
supporters began in Central and East Java,38 with military forces arming, training,
and supporting youth groups, mainly from Muslim and Christian organizations.39 In
Central Java, according to Sarwo Edhie, the ofﬁcer in command of the anti-Communist
operations there, the massacres were initiated by his troops from the Army Paracom-
mando Regiment (RPKAD), which traveled from village to village, massacring alleged
Communists, sometimes killing the entire population of a village (except infants) if it
was suspected of being fully in support of the PKI.40 Edhie’s RPKAD moved out from
Jakarta through Central and East Java and ﬁnally to Bali, organizing massacres along
the way.41 Sensing that his units were too small to attack all the alleged Communist vil-
lages in the province, Edhie began delegating more responsibility to civilian youth,
nationalist, and religious groups: “We gave them two or three days’ training, then sent
them out to kill the Communists.”42 The troops also gave some of their prisoners to
civilian anti-Communist groups, who killed them with knives and sickles.43
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This pattern manifested itself across all the regions of the slaughter: civilians, usually
part of larger organizations,44 carried out the majority of the killings, but they had sup-
port, weapons, and training from the military, which still directly participated in many
of the killings. While there were existing tensions between PKI supporters and anti-
Communists across Indonesia, Aceh was an exception: in most regions, as in Central
Java, the massacres did not begin until after the arrival of troops.45 In Bali, it was only
after the replacement of the governor, a radicalization among the local military estab-
lishment, and the arrival of troops from Java in early December that massacre of PKI
supporters began. To polarize the population in Bali, propaganda teams spread the mes-
sage through rural areas that “there are only two possible alternatives; to be on the side
of the G-30-S or to stand behind the government in crushing the G-30-S.”46 Village
authorities in particular were exhorted to promote the purge of the PKI, and some of
them used “institutions of communal responsibility and labor” to carry out the kill-
ings.47 One older Muslim leader considered the killings by Ansor, a leading Muslim
youth group, as “the will of God; at the same time he said that Ansor had ‘fulﬁlled the
command of the army.’”48
It was difﬁcult for PKI members and afﬁliates to resist the tide of violence, as
almost all of them had been completely in the dark about the events of September 30.
Instead, there was bewilderment and a scramble for survival. A communist youth orga-
nization member recalled, “We were confused. The leaders of the organization didn’t
know what to do. There was a curfew, so I didn’t stay at home. I slept in the backyard
along with other friends. We didn’t know anything. After a few nights we went our dif-
ferent ways, trying to save ourselves.”49 Though there is evidence of some villages, espe-
cially in Java, organizing for defense against the anti-Communist onslaught, most of
those targeted offered little resistance in the face of death.50
Killings took place throughout the country, but the worst-affected areas were Aceh,
Bali, Central Java, East Java, and Northern Sumatra. The massacres were committed
with extreme brutality.51 While the military tended to shoot those Communists they
took prisoner, common methods of killing by civilians were beating, throat cutting, and
decapitation. Some particularly enterprising killers in Cirebon in West Java constructed
a guillotine to expedite their work.52 According to one report, victims were given knives
and told to kill themselves; if they refused, they were shot in the back.53 Corpses were
often dumped into rivers and, as described by an eyewitness in Central Java, “the depar-
ture of corpses from the Kediri region down the Brantas achieved its golden age when
bodies were stacked together on rafts over which the PKI banner proudly ﬂew.”54 There
were so many bodies ﬂowing downstream that barriers were put up to keep them out of
irrigation channels; in Surabaya, corpses “became a danger to public health when eb-
bing tides deposited them on river banks.”55 Where there were no rivers, bodies were
dumped into mass graves, sometimes dug by the victims themselves.
And who were these victims? To be certain, many of those killed were, in fact, PKI
members, or members of closely aligned organizations; others, however, were only mar-
ginally afﬁliated with the PKI and the permissiveness of the situation led to violence
being used to solve more localized disputes as well, which played out along religious,
ethnic, economic, and personal lines.56 Youth organizations in Java traveled from village
to village using lists57 and informants to root out “Communists,” but “teachers and
other village intellectuals were especially common on the lists of victims.”58 In some
massacres, children were killed and it was common to kill the families of alleged PKI
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supporters in order to prevent future retribution.59 Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santi-
karma found in Bali that most of those killed as Communists “went to their deaths de-
nying such afﬁliation” and often “the label ‘communist’ was attached to victims and, by
extension, to their family and friends and even casual acquaintances once they were
dead, as an after-the-fact explanation of their fate.”60 The powerful demonization and
dehumanization of “Communists” allowed the misapplication of that label to be used as
a justiﬁcation for killing people “over land, over inheritance, and over more personal
problems such as long-remembered insults or sexual jealousy.”61 Thus, in a campaign
supposedly based on ideology, thousands were killed for “reasons that had little or noth-
ing to do with ideology.”62 Killings over land were often rooted in the PKI’s land reform
campaigns and the more general conﬂict between landowners and peasants. In one
region of Sumatra, Javanese transmigrants were killed by the local population,63 while
elsewhere, “on the ﬁrst day of the mass killings, one army ofﬁcer in civilian dress cheer-
fully left Kediri city, carrying a machine-gun, to shoot squatters who had refused to get
off his untilled land.”64 Ethnic Chinese were also targeted, in some cases due to their
mother country’s Communism, and in others for localized, economic reasons. Cribb ar-
gues, though, that the murders of and riots against Chinese during the Killings were
not out of proportion with prior and later eruptions of violence against Chinese in
Indonesia,65 and scholarly and media accounts have tended to give highly inﬂated esti-
mates of Chinese deaths.66
Women were singled out for especially brutal treatment. The myth of Gerwani
members mutilating and killing the generals during the G-30-S incident enraged the
population. “Communist” women were thus seen as savage monsters who were guilty
not only of the alleged crimes against the generals, but, in the words of Suharto, whose
“sadistic practices . . . had destroyed the identity of Indonesian women.”67 Some of the
anti-Communist slogans used were “‘Gerwani Tjabol’ (Gerwani Whores), ‘Gantung
Gerwani’ (Hang Gerwani) and ‘Ganjang Gerwani’ (Crush Gerwani).”68 In Bali, thou-
sands of women were rounded up and taken to government ofﬁces to have their genitals
examined for signs of sexual activity, which, it was claimed, could identify them as Ger-
wani members; these searches were frequently accompanied by rape.69 In a gendered
analysis of the Killings, Saskia Wieringa ﬁnds that in Indonesia’s sexually repressed
society, the alleged brazen sexual transgressions of the Gerwani women were both
arousing and infuriating to the young, often religious, men who comprised the majority
of the killers.70 The forms that violence against women took bear out this argument. A
document received by the human rights group Tapol is particularly illuminating: a
female PKI member was ordered to strip and had her “body and honor” burned before
she was hacked to death; a newlywed Gerwani member was raped multiple times by an
Ansor group and then was “slit open from her breasts to her vulva”; a woman nine
months pregnant was killed, then had her stomach cut open and her child butchered71;
another Gerwani leader was impaled through her vagina with a sharpened bamboo
pole.72 These extremes of violence reﬂect the dehumanization caused by the Gerwani
myth and also a reassertion of male power and control over female sexuality, eliminat-
ing those who would challenge it.73
By late December, the fury and pace of the Killings had slowed as the military
sought to consolidate violence under its control and restrain anti-Communist vigilante
groups in order to prevent anarchy.74 Massacres continued regularly into 1966, followed
by a period of what the army called “mopping-up operations,” aimed at hunting down
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the few remaining Communist cells.75 These operations peaked with the massacre of
hundreds of alleged Communist prisoners at Purwodadi in November and December
1968; Indonesian Institute for Human Rights Vice-Chairman Johannes Princen, who
investigated the massacre, concluded that at least 860 prisoners had been beaten to
death.76 Hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged supporters continued to be
imprisoned and in some cases used as slave labor, while being given insufﬁcient food
and denied medicine.77
It is uncertain how many people were actually killed during the massacres of 1965–
1966. Cribb provides a comprehensive list of the varying death toll estimates, which
range from 78,000 (from a late 1965 Indonesian government “fact-ﬁnding” commis-
sion) to 2,000,000.78 More recently, Cribb has come to believe that the correct ﬁgure for
those killed between October 1965 and March 1966 is approximately 500,000, while
Dwyer and Santikarma argue that this is still an underestimation.79 What is certain is
that the PKI, which in 1965 claimed 3 million members and 20 million people in af-
ﬁliated organizations,80 was destroyed as a political force. The New Order government,
however, still invoked the threat of Communism and continued to demonize all those
associated with it. A “clean environment” policy was instituted, whereby the descen-
dants of those who had been killed or imprisoned were considered “children of the
PKI . . . ‘infected’ by ‘political uncleanliness,’ ” and were discriminated against in
employment, education, and social services.81 These policies held even for children
born after 30 September 1965.82 There is also a sense that even after the physical elimi-
nation of the PKI, its pernicious spirit remains. As James Siegel writes,
Since the 1980s at least, Indonesian political leaders have spoken of organizations
without form when implying presumed communist resurgence. The state has gone
to great lengths to keep track not only of those communists released from years in
prison, but also of their descendants. This seems to indicate fear of something they
cannot locate, even when they know precisely who is a communist and who is the
son or daughter of one.83
In the aftermath of the Killings, with the elimination of the Communists from the
political scene, the military—most speciﬁcally, the army—was free to consolidate its
control over the government, deposing Sukarno in 1967 and ofﬁcially transferring presi-
dential power to Suharto. The army thoroughly penetrated all levels of government
across Indonesia, allowing it to quickly snuff out any political challengers and to exer-
cise complete control over policy.84 Thus, many of the same ofﬁcers who presided over
the Killings were still in positions of power in 1974, at the beginning of Indonesia’s next
episode of mass killing.
East Timor
Less than a decade after taking power and presiding over the purge of Communists, the
New Order regime decided to embark on a mission of territorial expansion. Indonesia
had taken control of the Dutch half of the island of Timor at independence, but the
other side, East Timor, remained under Portuguese colonial rule. With the collapse of
Portugal’s dictatorship in April 1974, the future of East Timor was thrown into ques-
tion. There were three different visions for the future, each with its supporters in East
Timor: independence, autonomous association with Portugal, or integration with Indo-
nesia. There were also three major political parties in East Timor at this time: the
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Timorese Democratic Union (UDT); the Timorese Social Democratic Association
(ASDT), which in September became the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (Fretilin)85; and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). The
UDT and ASDT/Fretilin supported independence, while Apodeti favored integration
with Indonesia.
Indonesia’s foreign minister, Adam Malik, gave assurances of Indonesian non-
interference in East Timorese internal politics, but the military ofﬁcers who were truly in
charge of the government had different ideas. They thought an independent East Timor
would destabilize their country by sparking desires for independence among discon-
tented ethnic groups on nearby Indonesian islands such as Ambon.86 The military
group, operating under and with the support of Suharto, included Major-General Ali
Murtopo, Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama, and Major-General Benny Murdani,87 all of
whom had served during the Killings. In order to facilitate the integration of East Timor,
the group began using special forces troops, propaganda, and small numbers of internal
supporters to destabilize East Timor in what was called Operation Komodo. The military
group also exploited fears of Communism to push for the annexation of East Timor,
with Sugama painting the UDT as socialist and Fretilin as Communist,88 and the group
going so far as to allege that ethnic Chinese Communists who had ﬂed the Killings had
relocated to East Timor to use the territory as a launching pad for further destabilization
of Indonesia.89 The Indonesians were able to inﬁltrate the UDT and used false claims
about Fretilin to press the UDT into staging a coup in an attempt to seize control, which
led to a short civil war in which Fretilin quickly defeated the UDT. The radio station
Indonesia had set up to broadcast propaganda into East Timor falsely reported heavy
ﬁghting and atrocities committed by Fretilin, prompting many East Timorese living near
the border to ﬂee into Indonesian West Timor. Here they became pawns, used by Indo-
nesia as evidence of the instability of East Timor, the threat it posed to Indonesia itself,
and thus the need for intervention.90 The plans for the destabilization and invasion were
drawn up by Generals Murtopo and Murdani, members of the larger Javanese military
clique that had risen to power with Suharto from 1965 onwards.91
The small remaining Portuguese military force and administration took refuge on
the island of Atauro during the civil war, and when they did not return, Fretilin took full
control of the government. Disappointed by the UDT’s loss and the failure of Apodeti to
gain traction, Indonesia decided to begin more active and direct military actions, attack-
ing East Timorese towns. Fretilin had been biding its time on declaring independence,
but after an intense Indonesian attack on the town of Atabae, the group’s leadership
decided that a full-scale Indonesian invasion was imminent and that the only possibility
for staving it off would be to declare independence and so gain the protection of the
United Nations. However, the United States and Australia—the two countries most in-
vested in the situation (for geostrategic and economic reasons, respectively)—had come
down in favor of an Indonesian annexation: the US to oppose the left-wing leanings of
Fretilin and protect deep-water passages in the Timor Sea for its nuclear submarines and
Australia in large part to protect oil exploration agreements and other economic ties.92
As one Australian ofﬁcial put it, “The plain fact is that there are only 700,000 Timorese;
what we are really concerned about is our relationship with 130,000,000 Indonesians.”93
So outside help was not forthcoming for the East Timorese.
The full-scale Indonesian invasion began on 7 December 1975, spearheaded by
an assault on Dili from air, land, and sea. Fretilin prepared defenses in the city and
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provided stronger resistance than expected, but the Indonesians almost immediately
turned their full force against the civilian population. Indiscriminate massacres took
place all over the city, with a large number of executions at the waterfront that included
women and children. Indonesian forces had been told prior to the invasion that they
were “ﬁghting Communists in the cause of Jihad (Holy War), just as they had done in
Indonesia in 1965” and the Timorese were presented as “backward, primitive, almost
sub-human.”94 There were many stories, John Taylor writes, “of entire families being
shot for displaying Fretilin ﬂags on their houses, of groups being shot for refusing to
hand over their personal possessions, of grenades being rolled into packed houses, and
of Fretilin sympathizers being singled out for immediate execution.”95 There was no
method to the madness; on one occasion, for example, Indonesian soldiers asked a
group of 30 integration supporters what political party they belonged to, and then
machine gunned them even after they answered “Apodeti.”96 Even those East Timorese
who ﬂed into West Timor as refugees were targeted there, with their houses burned and
perhaps thousands killed.97
At a greater level than during the Killings, ethnic Chinese were targeted in Dili and
elsewhere. During the initial attack on Dili, many of those executed were Chinese; after
the assault on the city, a Catholic priest reported that 2,000 people had been killed in
the ﬁrst few days after the landing and 700 of them were Chinese.98 Meanwhile, in the
towns of Maubara and Liquiça, the entire Chinese population was killed.99 This came
despite many Chinese having been among the strongest supporters of Indonesian inter-
vention.100
Fretilin was forced to withdraw to the hills, taking thousands of civilians with
them. Indonesian forces countered with brutal counterinsurgency campaigns from 1977
to 1979, using such indiscriminate weapons as rocket batteries and napalm.101 It was
also alleged that Indonesian troops could be promoted for “acts of savagery against the
Timorese population.”102 The goal of these operations was termed the “encirclement
and annihilation” of Fretilin, and the US State Department called it Indonesia’s “ﬁnal
solution” for East Timor.103 Food supplies in Fretilin-controlled areas were especially
targeted and villages known or suspected of supporting the group were “systematically
wip[ed] out.”104 A priest in Dili described in November 1977 “the barbarities (under-
standable in the Middle Ages, and justiﬁable in the Stone Age), the cruelties, the pilla-
ging, the unqualiﬁed destruction of Timor, the executions without reason” and
expressed his fear that “genocide will come soon, perhaps by next December.”105 Indo-
nesian rhetoric promoted the biological extermination of the Timorese as it had with
the PKI. Following massacres in 1976 in Remexio and Aileu in which all residents
over the age of three were shot, the local people were described as having been “infected
with the seeds of Fretilin.”106
For those who managed to survive the encirclement and annihilation campaign, a
cruel fate awaited: they were rounded up by Indonesian forces and transported to “re-
settlement camps,” where they were not provided with and were prevented from grow-
ing sufﬁcient food to survive, in addition to being used for forced labor. One priest
wrote that “if the Indonesians were to allow Timorese people to move around freely
and live where they like, there would be no shortage of food.”107 Indonesian troops
looted crops and livestock and robbed the pantries of houses.108 Aid groups were sys-
tematically denied access to the population and whatever aid that did arrive was stolen
by Indonesian soldiers and sold at inﬂated prices,109 while one report found that there
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was corn rotting away in warehouses in Dili.110 As a result, East Timorese starved and
died of disease by the thousands.
In May 1981, Indonesia launched a new offensive code-named Operation Security,
which the Defense Department also called “the ‘ﬁnal’ or ‘decisive’ war.”111 This opera-
tion was also one of encirclement, but this time the Indonesians tried a new method.
Tens of thousands of men between the ages of 15 and 50—though sometimes as young
as 9 and as old as 60—were ordered to march in front of Indonesian troops as they ap-
proached suspected Fretilin positions so as to force Fretilin soldiers to choose between
shooting their countrymen and surrendering. This method, known as pagar betis, or
“the fence of legs,” had previously been used in Indonesia to round up suspected Com-
munists during the Killings.112 One particular incident of note during this period was
the massacre of over 400 people at Lacluta in September 1981, where the targets were
mostly women and children, and the young were killed by smashing their heads against
rocks.113 Beyond those who were actually killed during pagar betis sweeps, the opera-
tions took men away from their crops, exacerbating the food shortage and starvation.
Pagar betis was also part of a plan to “Timorize” the war, in which some Timorese
came to the Indonesian side in exchange for pay or the opportunity to loot, in addition
to those forced to participate.114
Counterinsurgency operations continued throughout the 1980s, with ﬁghting ﬂuc-
tuating at times, but Indonesian forces remaining brutal. For instance, in August 1983,
the village of Malim Luro was looted by Indonesian troops who then bound over 60
men, women, and children, forced them to lie on the ground, and crushed them with a
bulldozer.115 Indonesians discussed their intent to destroy Fretilin “to the third or
fourth generation,”116 and food sources were still constantly attacked.117 It was also dur-
ing the 1980s that Indonesia began a program of transmigration, bringing Indonesians
from other islands and settling them in “the more fertile regions” of East Timor118;
combined with voluntary migrants, by 1992 there were estimated to be 100,000 Indone-
sians living in East Timor out of a total population of 750,000.119 International attention
was again focused on Indonesia after the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, when an esti-
mated 273 peaceful protestors were killed,120 but international outrage quickly dissi-
pated. Meanwhile, the Indonesians continued attacking and torturing the East
Timorese population and continued their practice of choosing ominous military code
names including 1997’s Operation Annihilation, in which hundreds were rounded up,
tortured, and in some cases killed in response to Fretilin attacks.121 Torture remained
prevalent, with one post-conﬂict survey ﬁnding that approximately half of all East Ti-
morese had suffered some form of physical, sexual, or psychological torture.122
The opportunity to break the decades-long cycle of violence ﬁnally arrived in 1998
with an economic crisis in Indonesia that led to the forced resignation of Suharto. His
successor, B. J. Habibie, made overtures toward peace and eventually decided to allow a
referendum to choose independence or autonomy for East Timor, under the auspices of
the United Nations. Yet his actions were contradicted by the military establishment,
which was sending thousands of new troops into East Timor to sabotage the referen-
dum. Troops worked with pro-Indonesian militias, arming and training them as they
had in 1965, to embark on a campaign of destruction, with an Indonesian lieutenant-
colonel calling for “the killing of pro-independence movement leaders, their children,
and even their grandchildren.”123 Hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands
ﬂed their homes in response to the increasing violence. As Geoffrey Robinson argues,
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the militias “provided a perfect cover for ofﬁcial efforts to disrupt, or affect the outcome
of, the vote while simultaneously perpetuating the illusion that the ﬁghting was among
East Timorese,”124 a continuation of the program to Timorize the violence. Yet with an
extraordinary turnout estimated at 90%, the East Timorese people voted for indepen-
dence. This outcome was obviously not the result the Indonesian military or militias
had desired, and it was met with a campaign of total destruction—killing, rape, looting,
and so forth125—during which at least 150,000 people were taken into West Timor
against their will.126 Even after the referendum, the Indonesian military would not let
East Timor out of its control and it was only with the intervention of a UN force in late
September that the Indonesians ﬁnally left and widespread violence ceased.
As in the Killings, women were speciﬁcally targeted throughout the Indonesian
occupation. In the aftermath of the initial attack on Dili in 1975, Indonesian forces de-
manded women to use for their pleasure, and women who were related to Fretilin mem-
bers or were themselves members of associated organizations were singled out, like the
targeting of Gerwani during the Killings; the women were then imprisoned, tortured,
and raped, a pattern which continued in Dili for months.127 Rape became used as a
method of emphasizing Indonesia’s dominance of East Timor and a way to destroy Ti-
morese communities.128 Indonesia also embarked on a program of forced population
control, using surgical sterilization, injections of Depo Provera contraceptive, and even
infanticide.129
Indonesia was seeking to control the already degraded population of East Timor.
While estimates vary, the general consensus is that about 200,000 East Timorese died
from direct killing, starvation, and disease as a result of the Indonesian incursions and
occupation during 1974–1999.130 The UN-mandated Commission for Reception, Truth
and Reconciliation in East Timor found a minimum possible conservative death toll
totaling 102,800: 18,600 ±1,000 killings or disappearances and 84,200 ±11,000 deaths
due to hunger and illness beyond expected peacetime levels. It also reported that deaths
due to hunger and illness could have been as high as 183,000, which would be consis-
tent with an overall death toll of approximately 200,000.131 Clearly, as in the Killings,
hundreds of thousands of people died and the Indonesian military bears the ultimate
responsibility. But were these cases of genocide?
The Genocide Debate
Genocide, as deﬁned by the Article 2 of the UNCG, is the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
a. Killing members of the group
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group132
This deﬁnition excludes political and social groups, but many genocide scholars
include these in their deﬁnitions of genocide. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s deﬁni-
tion acknowledges victims that belong to “a group, as that group and membership in it
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are deﬁned by the perpetrator,” while Israel Charny includes as genocide any mass kill-
ing based on a shared characteristic, and Helen Fein argues that genocide is a “sustained
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indir-
ectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group mem-
bers.”133
PKI members and the party’s alleged supporters would not meet the UN’s deﬁni-
tion of victims of genocide since they were part of a political group and were targeted as
such; however they could ﬁt into the above deﬁnitions that allow for social or political
groups. The overall target for extermination was the G-30-S movement, which was de-
ﬁned by the New Order as the PKI or “Communists” in general. The statements and ac-
tions of the military and the New Order government in encouraging and organizing the
Killings show a clear intent to eliminate the PKI, and the equating of Communism with
an infection and something heritable presents it as a problem that can be remedied
through physical means—in this case, extermination. While the Killings cannot legally
be considered genocide, they have been accepted as genocide under the wider deﬁnition
that includes politicide.134 An alternate approach is to view Indonesia at the time of the
Killings through Christian Gerlach’s lens—as an “extremely violent society”135—in
which the military, civil society groups, and individuals joined together to destroy the
PKI for distinct, self-interested reasons, diffusing the intent required by the UNCG.
The case of East Timor is also nuanced. Ben Saul contends that the East Timorese
cannot be considered a national group for the period prior to 1999, since their sover-
eignty had not been recognized.136 I would argue, though, concurring with David Lis-
son, that the support Fretilin enjoyed from the majority of the population and its
declaration of independence in 1975 would constitute an exercise of the right to self-
determination; thus, the East Timorese can be considered a national group.137 Saul fur-
ther argues that much of the killing was done by East Timorese against one another, so
this might be considered a case of “auto-genocide”; however, the Indonesian policy
of Timorizing the conﬂict demonstrates Indonesian intent behind this intranational
violence. Indonesia’s systematic destruction of food sources and its failure to provide
adequate subsistence alternatives would meet Article 2 (c)’s condition of “deliberately
inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion.” It was for this reason that the truth commission accused Indonesia of committing
genocide by starvation.138 The coercive sterilization and birth control programs were
clearly aimed at preventing births within the group. In the words of one Timorese,
after at least 200,000 people have been killed off . . . any talk of over-population
is . . . ludicrous. There’s absolutely no need for family planning, but it’s quite clear
that the reason why the Indonesians are resorting to this kind of thing is because
they want to kill off the Timorese and re-populate our country with their own
people.139
The targeting of Chinese in East Timor that reduced their population from about
20,000 at the time of the invasion to only a few thousand within a decade140 also quali-
ﬁes as a genocidal action as they were singled out due to their ethnicity.141 Overall,
human rights violations by the Indonesian military and their auxiliaries in East Timor
“were of a systemic nature, indicating a purpose beyond the destruction of individual
victims.”142 Thus, I ﬁnd that East Timor, too, was a case of genocide143 and one that
could be prosecuted based on the UNCG.144
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Conclusion
There were many parallels between the two mass killings committed by the New Order:
the involvement of the same clique of generals; allegations of Communism; targeting
of Chinese; gender and sexual violence; tactics like pagar betis and the delegation of
violence to non-state actors; and a violent rhetoric of extermination, often couched in
biological and genetic terms.145 Another common factor is that there has been no prose-
cution of the perpetrators in either case. The Indonesian military’s ﬁrm control over the
government ensured prosecution would not take place after the Killings, and of the few
ofﬁcers brought to trial in Indonesia for atrocities committed in East Timor, most have
been acquitted, and the few sentences handed out have been light.146
The cases of the Indonesian Killings and the occupation of East Timor bear out
Fein and Barbara Harff’s ﬁndings that perpetrators of genocide are likely to commit it
again as elites and the military become habituated to it.147 The failure of the interna-
tional community to sanction the New Order regime after the Killings emboldened it
and gave it a sense of free rein in East Timor, bolstered by the material and political
support of powerful Western allies. While the Killings served as an example that was
emulated in East Timor, the impunity with which the New Order acted serves as an
example to the world. Since the invasion of East Timor in 1974, the regimes of both
Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, for example, likely felt secure in committing
multiple ethnic mass killings.148
The Indonesian military’s continued inﬂuence in the government and the country’s
continued policies of internal colonization and suppression of ethnic resistance mean
that similar tactics and outcomes may be seen today in West Papua, where violence,
transmigration, and cultural suppression have led many to conclude that genocide is
ongoing.149 The “secession” of East Timor has been used by the Indonesian military as
a justiﬁcation for harsh measures in West Papua, where Kopassus special forces units—
the successors of Sarwo Edhie’s Killings-era RPKAD and themselves responsible for
many atrocities in Timor—are among the most active and have similar operational co-
denames, such as Clean Sweep and Annihilation.150
There is continuity among Indonesian military and political leaders through the
conﬂicts. Kopassus is currently led by Pramono Edhie Wibowo, son of Sarwo Edhie. In
1999, he led an anti-terrorism sub-unit of Kopassus that was accused of facilitating a
deadly attack on the Catholic diocese ofﬁce in Dili.151 Kopassus forces under Pramono
were subsequently accused of committing human rights violations against Papuans.152
The current president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is the son-in-law of
Sarwo Edhie and in fact served three tours of duty in the military during “paciﬁcation”
operations in East Timor.153 Further, General Timbul Silaen, previously police chief in
East Timor in 1999, was appointed to the same post in West Papua in 2003.154 Scholars
who speak Indonesian would likely be able to uncover many more ofﬁcers with involve-
ment in both the Killings and East Timor or East Timor and West Papua.
In the cases of both the Killings and the invasion and occupation of East Timor, In-
donesia’s neighbors and allies—in particular the United States, and Australia in the case
of East Timor—had ample opportunity to oppose the violence and bring pressure
to bear on the Indonesian government and military to halt their genocidal actions. Evi-
dence even suggests that US opposition to the invasion of East Timor through a
cutoff of military funding to Indonesia would have resulted in minimal damage to bilat-
eral relations.155 However, realpolitik, self-interest, and disinterest won out among the
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Western powers, allowing the genocidal campaigns to proceed. While it is possible for
individuals and civil society to intervene early in the process of genocide to try to halt
it,156 this private intervention is especially difﬁcult in the authoritarian settings of most
genocidal regimes, where information and opposition are tightly controlled. Thus, inter-
national intervention was needed to stop the Indonesian campaigns, and though it is
those countries with the closest relations with the perpetrator government that have the
most leverage, they also have the strongest disincentives to act.157 In the cases discussed
in this article, these close allies aided and abetted the ongoing genocides. Impunity and
international inaction allowed the Indonesian government and military to view geno-
cide as an acceptable tactic in the pursuit of power consolidation, territorial gain, and
economic expansion.
Without international condemnation and punishment or domestic outcry, geno-
cide becomes part of a repertoire of repression and control for regimes. Patterns of rape
and massacre learned and used during the Killings were embedded in the institutional
repertoire of the Indonesian military and state, then applied to East Timor. If genocide
truly is “our era’s most heinous crime,”158 the international community must act ac-
cordingly to ensure that genocidal regimes are punished for the atrocities they commit
and that any steps toward reoffending are cut short.
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